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THE MISSOURI SUPREME JUDGESHIP.
Conflict between Executive and Judiciary-_Powerm of Constitutional Convention- Quo Warranto.
The last four years of civil conflict have produced many new
and important questions of a legal nature, to which, for the information of the profession, it is our duty as journalists to allude.
These questions partake sometimes of a political character, and
are therefore interesting to statesmen as well as to lawyers and
jurists. They but too frequently are made to assume a partisan
character ; and when they do, we cannot too carefully guard ourselves against the bias which.may arise from this source.
The recent conflict between the Executive of the state of Missouri (Governor FLETCHER) and two of the late judges of the
Supreme Court of that state (Judges BAY and DRYDEN), while
its occurrence is to be regretted, is now a matter of legal -and
general history, and presents two or three questions of absorbing
professional and public interest.
On the 14th day of June 1865, these judges, claiming to be
the legal members of the court and to act as such, were forcibly
removed by the governor. That act has been much applauded
by some as a firm and fearless exercise of an undoubted executive
duty, and by others denounced as illegal, revolutionary, and
despotic.
The controversy brings into view the powers of the convention
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of the people which assembled to amend the constitution of the
state, and also the propriety and legality of the course pursued
by the executive, in ejecting by force the late judges from the
bench. Before pronouncing any opinion, or offering any observations on these questions, it is essential to ascertain the precise
facts of the case.
In 1863-4 the General Assembly of Missouri, pursuant, as we
suppose, to provisions in the existing constitution, passed an Act
for submitting the question of calling a convention to amend the
constitution to a vote of the people, and for an election of delegates to the convention if the people voted in favor of calling
one. The preamble to that Act (see Laws of Missouri, 1863-4) is
as follows: "Whereas, in the opinion of the General Assembly,
the condition of affairs in the state demands that a convention
of the people be called to take such action as the interest and
welfare thereof may require;" therefore, be it enacted, &c.
The duties of the convention are thus set forth in section 5 of
the Act, the only one relating to the powers and duties of the
.eonvention when it assembles:"SEc. 5. The delegates elected under the provisions of this
.let shall assemble at St. Louis on the 6th day of January 1865,
ana organize themselves into a convention by the election of a
president and such other officers as they may deem necessary,
and -shall proceed to consider, first, such amendments to the constitution of the state as may be by them deemed necessary for
the .,emancipation of slaves; second, such amendments to the
constitution of the state as may be by them deemed necessary to
preserve in purity the elective franchise to loyal citizens; and
sUdh,.oher amendments as may be b6,them deemed essential to the
promotion,of the PTblic good."
Section '1O provides that the question "for a convention, or
against aeenvention," shall be submitted to the people, and if a
majority of the qualified voters were in favor of a convention, the
delegates sheuld meet as directed.
A majority being in favor of the convention, and delegates
being elected pursuant to section 5 above quoted, the convention
in due form assembled at the prescribed time and place; and,
among other doings, passed, March 17th, an "cordinance" by
which it was declared " that the offices of the judges of the Supreme
Uourt, of all Circuit Courts, and of all courts of record, &c.,
shali be vacated on the first day of May, A. D. 1865."
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Among the members of the state convention which passed this
ordinance was the Hon. CHARLES D. DRAKE, author of the wellknown work on Attachments. Some of his fellow-citizens requested his views on the questions involved, to which he replied
in a lengthy and very elaborate letter, in which the facts of the
case seem to be fairly stated.
According to Mr. DRAKE, the facts, so far as he has been able
to ascertain them, are as follows:" In the year 1861, WILLIAM SCOTT, WILLIAM B. NAPTON, and
EPHRAIM B. EWING were the judges of the Supreme Court of this
state, and their term of office was to expire in the year 1863.
"cOn the 16th of October, 1861, the state convention elected by
the people in the previous month of February, adopted an ordinance, which, among other things, required each civil officer in
this state, within sixty days thereafter, to take and subscribe a
certain oath; failing in which, their offices were then to become
vacant. Judges SCOTT, NAPTON, and EWING failed to take the
required oath, and their offices were consequently vacated on the
17th of December 1861, and BARTON BATES, WILLIAM V..N.
BAY, and JOHN D. S. DRYDEN were, by Governor Gamble, appointed judges of the court for the unexpired portion of the official term, that is, until an election should be held in 1868. In
November of that year an election was held, and Messrs. BATES,
BAY, and DRYDEN were declared elected, and composed the court
until February last, when Judge BATES resigned his office; Judges
BAY and DRYDEN retaining their positions.
"tOn the 17th of March last, the constitutional convention of
this state, elected, in November, 1864, adopted an ordinance declaring that on the first day of May 1865, sundry judicial and
ministerial offices should be vacated, and be filled for the remainder of their respective terms by appointment .by the governor.

The offices of the judges of the Supreme Court were among those
so vacated.
,, The governor was y the same ordinanceauthorized to fill any
vacancy ezisting at the date of its adoption, in any of the offices
therein named. In pursuance of this authority, the governor
appointed DAVID WAGNER to fill the vacancy created by the
resignation of Judge BATES; and afterwards appointed WALTER
L. LOVELACE and NATHANIEL HOLMES, to fill the vacancies
created by the operation of the ordinance in vacating the seats
of Judges BAY and DRYDEN.
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"c On the 29th of April, Mr. Andrew W. Mead, the clerk of
the Supreme Court, whose office, like those of the judges, had
been vacated, and who sought and received a re-appointment,
presented to the court, composed of Judges BAY and DRYDEN,
his commission as clerk from Governor Fletcher, with his oath of
office and his official bond, and the court thereupon made an order
of record in the following words:-', Andrew W. Mead presents to the court his commission as
clerk of the Supreme Court of the state of Missouri, held at St.
Louis, issued by the governor of the state of Missouri, in conformity with the provisions of an ordinance of the Missouri State
Convention, entitled 'An Ordinance providing for the vacating
of certain civil offices in the state, filling the same anew, and protecting the citizens from injury and harassment,' passed the 17th
day of March 1865; with his oath of office indorsed thereon ; he
also presents to the court his official bond, conditioned according
to law, with himself as principal and A. J. P. Garesche and John
Lewis as securities, which bond is APPROVED BY THE COURT.'
" In reference to this record entry, I suppose there is not anywhere a sound and fair-minded jurist, who would not say that it
was a direct and clear admission by the court of the legality of
Mr. Mead's appointment. If the court considered the ordinance
of March 17th a nullity, it was bound not to have taken any more
notice of his new commission than if it had been issued by a justice of the peace. Mr. Mead was first appointed by the court
itself, under the then existing law, for a term of years not yet
expired; and yet the court on its record admits that his official
-term had been cut short, and that lie had been rightfully appointed
clerk by another power than itself; and it sanctioned that appointment, by approving his bond, and admitting that he had been
-appointed under that ordinance.
; On that 29th of April, the only other business transacted by
the court was to enter one judgment in a pending case, and to
audit the accounts of the clerk, the marshal, and others for services, &c., as is always done on the last day of the term. This
was on Saturday, and on the following Monday, May 1st, the
vacating ordinance was to take effect. The court was adjourned
to the 5th of May; at which time Judges BAY and DRYDEN did
not appear; nor did they appear during any of the three following days; and, in conformity with the law, the court was thereby
adjourned till the next regular term in October. Ordinarily, for
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ten years past, that court has continued in session, at its March
term,until some time in June, and once till the 3d of July. During that period (except in the year 1861, when the term was suddenly cut short, in April, by the outbreak of the rebellion), that
term has not ended earlier than the 11th of June. When, therefore, Judges BAY and DRYDEN failed to resume their seats on the
5th of May, or within three days thereafter, the court was adjourned from five to eight weeks earlier than the usual time ; and
that, 'though there were on its docket about two hundred and
thirty cases awaiting a hearing. Without knowing the reasons
for their suffering the term to lapse, I think it no injustice to
them to infer that when they adjourned the court on the 29th of
April, they considered their functions at an end, and did not intend to attempt to resume their seats as judges. Otherwise they
were guilty of a manifest and causeless failure in the duty of resuming the sessions of the court on the 5th of May.
, On the 27th of May, Judges WAGNTER and LovELAcE made

a written order, calling a special term of the Supreme Court, to
be held on the 12th of June, and delivered it to Mr. Mead, the
clerk of the court, who filed iAin his office, where it is now to be
seen.
" On the 31st of May, in the Daily Missouri Democrat, the
clerk, as required by law, -published a notice that the special term
would be held, 'in pursuance of an order made by the judges of
the Supreme Court.' This notice bore the date of May 30th.
"By an entry made of record on the 12th of June, when
Messrs. BAY and DRYDEN assumed to hold the court, it appears
that they then opened the special term in pursuance of an order
purporting to have been made by them, and set forth in the
record, and dated the 30th of May; but I am informed by the
present clerk that the original of that order cannot be found in
his office. Whether this order was made on the day of its date,
I am not informed, and have no means of ascertaining.
,On the 12th of June, at the hour of nine o'clock A. M.,
Messrs. BAY and DRYDEN took the bench, in the Supreme Court
room, and, attended by the clerk and the marshal of the court,
proceeded to act as the Supreme Court, calling cases and hearing
arguments; and, when requested by Judges WAGNER and LovELACE, refusing to yiel*d their positions. The stated hour for opening the court had for many years been ten o'clock A. R.; but on
this occasion it was opened an hour in advance of that time.

-
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"Those gentlemen held court on the 12th and 13th without
interruption; but on the 14th, while on the bench, they were
waited upon by Brigadier-General D. C. Coleman, of the Missouri
militia, who presented to each of them a letter from Governor
Fletcher, in the following terms:" EXECUTIvE DEPARTMENT, Mo., June 13th 1865.
"SIR: By the ordinance of the State Convention, vacating certain offices,
the offices of the judges of the Supreme Court became vacant on the 1st day
of May last. By virtue of the authority conferred on me by that ordinance,
as governor of the state of Missouri, I have caused commissions to be issued
in legal form to Hon. David Wagner, Hon. Walter Lovelace, and Hon. Nathaniel Holmes, as judges of the Supreme Court, and who have qualified as
such judges.
"The ordinance referred to is the supreme law on that subject, and it is
my imperative duty to enforce it, which duty I shall pursue the most summary course in performing, and will treat as they deserve any acts on your
part done in furtherance of a design to intrude yourself into and usurp the
powers of the office of a judge of the Supreme Court.
"Respectfully yours,
"Tnos. C. FLETCHER,
"Governor of Missouri."

"Messrs. BAY and DRYDEN declined to leave the bench in compliance with the letter of Governor FLETCHER; whereupon
General COLEMAN produced the following Special Order, issued
by the Governor as Commander-in-Chief of the Militia:
"HEADQUARTERS, STATE or Mo., June 14th 1865.
"Special Order.
"I. The usurping judges of the Supreme Court will be compelled to submit to the ordinance of the State Convention vacating certain offices.
"II. David Wagner, Walter S. Lovelace, and Nathaniel Holmes will be
put in possession of the Supreme Court room, in the court-house, at St. Louis,
with all the records, seals, furniture, books, and papers of the office of clerk
of the Supreme Court.
"II. Brig.-Gen. D. C. Coleman is charged with the execution f the order,
and will employ such force for that purpose as he may deem necessary, and
arrest all persons who may oppose him.
" THos. C. FLETCIER,

"Governor and Commander-in-Chief."
"General Coleman also produced the following letter from
Governor Fletcher to him :" HEADQUARTERS, STATE OF MO., June 14th 1865.

"GENERAL: Herewith please find special order directing you to enforce
the ordinance of the State Convention vacating certain offices, by putting the
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recently-appointed judges of the Supreme Court into the possession of the
court-room, records, &c., of that court.
"You will proceed to the court-house, and on the arrival of Messrs. Dryden
and Bay, deliver to each of them the sealed notes addressed to them respectively. An officer of the city police will accompany you, and will have a force
of the city police at hand.
"If, after delivering the notes, the said. Bay and Dryden do any act to
disturb Messrs. Lovelace and Wagner in entering on said discharge of their
duties as judges, you will direct the policemen to arrest them, and take them
before the city recorder, and at once inform me of that fact.
"In case Messrs. Bay and Dryden do not come to the court-house at nine
o'clock or soon thereafter, you will cause the note referred to, to be delivered
to them at their rooms.
"In putting the judges into possession of the court-room and clerk's office,
you will, as far as convenient in your judgment, avoid the use of violent
means; but if in your judgment necessary, do not hesitate to employ all the
force it may require.
11THOS. 0. FLETCHER."y

"To Gen. David C. Coleman."
"cMessrs. BAY and DRYDEN still refusing to leave the bench,
General COLEMAN called in policemen, who, with no unnecessary
exhibition of force, removed them from the court-room to the
police office, and placed Judges WAGNER and LOVELACE in possession of the court-room and the records, papers, and seal of
the court; and they, with their associate, Judge HOLMES, have
since remained in possession thereof, and exercised the functions
of the court.
" In giving this history of the case, I believe I have stated all
the facts which have any bearing upon the question. If any
material fact has been omitted, it is because it has not come to
my knowledge, or has been inadvertently and unintentionally

overlooked.

"1

I The manner in which the removal of the judges was effected is thus stated
in an "Address to the People of Missouri," signed by Messrs.'Gantt, Glover,
Broadhead, and others, in which the arguments against the validity of the
vacating ordinance and the legality of the Executive's course are ably and
exhaustively stated. It being our purpose not to present a garbled or unfair
account, we subjoin the following extract from the "Address."
After stating
that Judges DRYDEN and BAY informed General Coleman that they would not
retire from the bench, and would yield to nothing short of overpowering force,
the "Address" proceeds:
"General Coleman thereupon left the room, and presently returned, followed
by a squad of Metropolitan Police of the city of St. Louis. He interrupted an
argument which a member of the bar was making to the court, and ordered the
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Personally we know nothing of the facts. Our discussion
will assume that they are stated with substantial accuracy,
although some of the circumstances detailed do not seem to be
material to the principles upon which any decision of the case
Avould turn.
That Messrs. BAY and DRYDEN were the legal judges of the
court down to the 1st of May is not, by any one, disputed;
whether they continued so after that date depends upon the
validity of the Ordinance vacating their offices. There can be
judges to leave their seats. They refused. General Coleman, turning to his
policemen, who were armed with clubs and pistols, ordered them to remove the
judges from their chairs. The policemen advanced and laid their hands on
Judges BAY and DRYDEN for that purpose, and they, rising from their seats, and
protesting against the indignity offered in their persons to the whole judicial
department, left their place.
"They were about to retire from this shameful scene, when General Coleman
stated that he had further orders to arrest their persons. This wis too much.
They demanded a sight of his warrant, and he produced the special order already
set forth.
"Judges DaYDEN and BAY informed General Coleman that his order did not
profess to give him any authority to arrest them, and that they would not allow
themselves to be seized on any such pretence. General Coleman then produced
his letter of instructions, but the Judges told him that this was equally defective
General Coleman then directed the policemen not t allow the Judges to leave
the room, and went out himself. He returned in half an hour, and then
informed the judges that they were arrested for a breach of the peace, upon a
complaint made before the Recorder. The policemen in attendance thereupon,
by order of General Coleman, took charge of Judges DRYDEN and BAY, and
required them to go to the police office, and give bail to answer the charge.
They were accordingly conducted on foot, to the police office, through a large
crowd drawn together by the rumor of the outrage. Arriving at the office, they
demanded to know the charge against them. The following paper was shown
to them by way of answer:
To the Judge of the Recorder's Court of St. Louis County:
"I complain of Win. V. N. Bay and John S. Dryden for disturbing the peace
by interference with the Supreme Court. Please summons as witnesses,
"DAVID WAGNER,
"WALTER

LOVELACE,

L.

"THos. C. FLETCHER,
"'D. C. COLEMAN,
cc-

BOxEN.

"Very respectfully,
cTHos.

C.

FLETCHER."

No complaint under oath was ever filed, and the charge was never prosecuted,
and was dismissed on the 15th day of June.
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no doubt that a constitutional convention, unless the delegates
are limited by the people, would, as representing the sovereignty
of the people, have the power to pass such an ordinance: Conner
vs. City of .NewYork, 2 Sandf. 355, 1849; State vs. McBride,
4 Mo. R. 303, 1836; Matter of Oliver Lee'8 Bank, 21 N. Y. 9,
12 (1860), per DENIo, J.
Respecting the question whether there was such a limitation,
conflicting views are entertained. On the one hand it is'maintained that the powers of the Convention are limited to the purposes specified in the Act of the Legislature (see section .5,
supra),
under which delegates were elected and the convention held. On
the other hand it is contended that the legislature can only provide the machinery for the election of delegates; that it is
illogical to maintain that an inferior body can restrain a superior;
that the delegates when assembled embody the sovereignty of
the people, and (to use the language of the late judge, subsequently Governor GAmBLE, in discussing a similar question in
1861) have ",all the power that the people would have if they
had all assembled in one vast plain, unless there has been some
limitation upon the power. They are almighty as far as the
people themselves would be almighty in respect to their own
government, if they were gathered in one great plain."
But the question here is, whether there was any limitation by
the people upon the power of the convention ? The circumstances of the present controversy do not call for an examination
of the question whether a state constitution may be formed or
amended, without the consent and action of the existing government, by the spontaneous or voluntary action of the people.
This question was much discussed by counsel in the greai case
of Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. (U. S. Rep.) 1, 20, 24, growing
out of the Dorr Bebellion, so-called. This case presented the
question whether the people's government, established by the
voluntary action of the people without the consent of the existing (charter) government, had displaced and annulled the latter.
It was contended by the counsel, who maintained the validity of
the Dorr Constitution, that the sovereignty of the people is
supreme, " and may act in forming governments without the assent
of the existing government: that in the United States no definite,
uniform mode has ever been established for either instituting or
changing a form of government, and that when an existing con-
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stitution points out a mode of change the people are not bound,
and may, if they please, adopt another mode." These propositions .were all denied by Mr. WEBSTER, who argued the cause
for the defendants, and whose revised argument, unsurpassed for
condensed, logical force, beauty of illustration, and purity of
language, will be found in Little & Brown's edition of his works,
vol. 6, p. 217.
The Supreme Court of the United States did not directly pass
upon these questions, holding that the question which of the two
rival or opposing governments was the legal one was, so far as
the United States was concerned, political, and not judicial in its
nature (7 How. Rep. 1).
Our opinion is (and it was so judicially held by the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island in the conviction of DORR for treason),
that attempts even by the people, if these attempts are unauthorized by law or the constitution, and are made against the consent, of the existing government, to form a new constitution and
erect a new state organization, are legally revolutionary in their
character, though politically considered they may or may not be
justifiable, according to circumstances.'
But a constitution may be amended or changed, without revolution, with the consent of the existing government, or in pursuance of provisions therein contained, authorizing such amendment or change. This was the character of the amendment
sought to be made in Missouri in the case under consideration.
The following well-established and fundamental principles of our
Anierican system of government are applicable : The people are

I

In the constitution of some of the states it is expressly declared in sub-

stance that "the people have at all times, an unalterable and indefeasible right

to alter, reform, or abolish their government in such a manner as they may think
po.per."
Section 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Missouri, in force previous to the new one, adopted June 6th 1865, contained the following provision
in relation to the alteration thereof, viz.: "The people of this state have the
inherent, sole, and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and
police thereof, and of alteringand abolishingtheir constitution and form of government whenever it may be necessary to their safety and happiness."
It also contained a provision (Art. 12), authorizing the General Assembly to
propose amendments, two-thirds of each house concurring, which shall be pub-

lished and take effect, if ratified by two-thirds of each house, after the next
general election.
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the source of all political power; but this power may be, and
indeed generally is, conferred upon delegates or representatives.
In electing delegates to a state convention the people may confer
plenary or unrestricted power, and will be taken to do so, unless
there is a clear limitation. The people may limit their delegates
to a consideration of specified amendments, and if they do, the
delegates cannot exceed their power. The legislature cannot,
by law, operating as a law, impose restraints upon the people,
or upon their delegates; but if under and by virtue of such a
law the people vote in favor of a convention specifically to
revise particularparts of the constitution and no more, this
evinces the intention of the people to confer upon their delegates
power to this limited extent only. This view has the sanction of

high judicial authority.
The judges of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
in1883, in answer to questions submitted to them by the House
of Representatives, were of the opinion that under the constitution (laying out of view the natural right of the people in cases
of great emergency to change their fundamental law) there was
no authority to make particular or specific amendments of the
constitution except in the manner prescribed in the constitution
itself.
And they furthermore were of the opinion that if. the legislature should submit to the people the expediency of calling a
convention of delegates for the purpose of revising or altering
the constitution in any specified parts of the same, and the people
should, by the terms of their vote, decide to call a convention to
consider the expediency of altering the constitution in some
particularpart or parts, the delegates would derive their whole

authority from such vote, and would have no right, under the
same, to act upon, and propose amendments in other parts of the
constitution not so specified. (Supplement to 6 Cush. Rep. 573,
1833). But if other amendments were proposed and subsequently ratified and adopted by the people, we see no reason to
doubt their validity and binding force.
Mr. DRAxE'S opinion, cited in the note, is to the same effect
as that expressed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.' The
I "You will agree with me," says Mr. DRA , "that Judge GAMBLE'S Views
as to the powers of a convention of the people are as broad as any supporter of
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next inquiry is, was there, under this view; any:limitation on the
power of the convention restraining it from passing the vacating
ordinance.
By recurring to section 5 of the Act of the Legislature under
which the delegates were elected, it will be seen that in addition
to considering amendments in relation to "the emancipation of
slaves," and ",to preserve in purity the elective franchise to
loyal citizens," it was provided that the convention should consider ,such OTHER amendments as may be by THEM deemed essential to the promotion of the public good."
Here is no restraining language. .Any amendment deemed by
the convention essential to the ptiblic good may be made.
But it may be claimed that the vacating ordinance is not an
"amendment" to the constitutibn, but an arbitrary edictukase-decree---sentence-judgment.
This view, we are inclined to think, makes the matter turn
upon form rather than substance. The convention, as we have
seen, had the power it exercised, and it is surely an immaterial
consideration whether the instrument which embodies the sovereign will is called an ,ordinance" or an ,amendment" to the
constitution.
It has been held in Texas (Stewart vs. Grosby, 15 Texas Rep.
546, 1855) that an ordinance appended by the constitutional
convention to the constitution of the state is binding upon the
Governor FLETC01R'S late action could wish. They maintain the simple, broad,
and perfectly intelligible proposition, in which I must fully concur, that such a
Convention is as almighty as the whole assembled people could be, unless in the
law authorizing the election of the convention there be found words limiting or
restraining the powers of the body. And ifsuch words be found there, they do
not, by their own force as law, limit or restrain the convention; for the legislature, being a subordinate body, has no power to do that- but they indicate the
purpose of the people in electing the convention, and the measure of power which
thei, by such election, confor upon the body. For instance, should a law be passid
authorizing the election of a convention, simply to revise and amend a state
constitution, the whole power of the people over that matter would, by the election, be vested in the convention. But'if the law should 'Provide that the convention, in revising and amending the constitution, should have no power to
adopt any provision esiablishing-or recognising the institution of negro slavery,
that would be a limitation; not imposed as law by the legislature, but signified
by the people in the act of electing the convention under that law. This I take
to be the precise definition of the relation of the law under which a convention
is elected, to the powers ot the body when assembled.'
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executive, legislative, and judicial departments of .the government equally as if it had been incorporated into and formed a
component part of the constitution.
These views lead to the conclusion that the appointees of the
Governor, and not Messrs. BAY and DRYDEN, were de jure the
judges of the court in June 1865, for legally there could not be
two sets of judges at the same time for the same court.' (See
I In expressing the view that the vacating ordinance was valid, I wish to add
that my mind does not repose upon the correctness of this opinion with that certainty and positiveness that are a ways desirable, though, unfortunately, not
always attainable. Looking at secion 5 of the Act of the Assembly, before
quoted, it is difficult to see that it imposes any limitations on the power of the
convention. It refers specifically to two amendments, one in relation to slavery,
and one in relation to the elective franchise, which were, doubtless, the leading
and primary objects of the contemplated convention, and then confers plenary
power over all other subjects. The word "amendment" it not, it. seems to me,
the material one. Instead of amending the "old," could not the colivention, as
they did,-make a new constitution? But that the opposite view may be seen, and
our readers judge for themselves, we state some facts not alluded to by Mr. DRAKE.
The convention met and organized January 6th 1865. On the l1th day of that
month they passed an "ordinance" for the immediate abolition of slavery in
Missouri. This was never submitted to the people. On the 17th day of March,
the vacating ordinance was adopted. This was never submitted to a popular
vote. These were adopted in convention before the new constitution was completed. When the constitution was completed, it provided that it should be submitted to the people on the 6th day of June, but this did not include the ordinances above named. These ordinances, if valid, went into effect before the
election on the 6th of June; and would hhve been operative had the new constitution been rejected. Many who deny the validity of thq vacating ordinance,
admit the validity of the ordinance of emancipation, on the ground that it was
Mr.
an alteration of the organic law, and was therefore an "amendment."
GLovEn, Cols. GANTT and BROADHEAD, and others, in the "Address" before
alluded to, take this view, or, at least, do not controvert its correctness. Their
argument against the validity of the vacating ordinance may be thus condensed:The convention could only "amend" the constitution. The constitution (Webster's DicL) is "a system of fundamental rules, principles, and brdinances fpr
the government of a state." Nothing is an amendment which does not leave its
impress upon the organic law, and which does not remain established as a part of
it. The vacatizig ordinance does not possess these attributes, and would have
been invalid, even if it had been inserted in the body of the constitution.
On the other hand, it is maintained that the constitution is a law-a rule-and
subject to amendment by the people. By it, unless amended, Judges BAY and
DTYDE were entitled to hold for six years. The convention ordained that in.
stead of holding six years their terms should expire May 1st, and the residue
of the term be filled in another manner, viz., by executive appointment. This
was a charge in the law or rule laid down in the constitution, and therefore
strictly and literally an amendment.
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Rildreth vs. McInire, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 206 '(1829) growing
out of the ",Old" and - New" court controversy in Kentucky:
see decisions of "New" Court, reported in 2 T. B. Monroe
Reports, and the history of this judicial struggle, in Judge
Robertson's Law and Politics, Men and Times, -p. 49 et seq.,
and in his Sketch of the Court of Appeals, in Collin's History
of Kentucky).
With respect to the action of the Governor in the forcible
The authors of the "Address" before referred to, signed by some of the acutest
and ablest lawyers in the state, lay down si; propositions as the groundwork of'
their argument. These are neatly, clearly, and forcibly expressed. We subjoin
them, that both sides of the case may be exhibited. They are as follows:,, 1st. That an assembly of any number of citizens less than the whole number
of the legal voters of the state, however respectable for character, talents, and
integrity, has no right to speak for or represent the people of the state, except
in virtue of delegated authority.
"2d. That in order to the delegation of any such authority there must be
regular action on the part of the lawfully constituted organs of popular will and
power, and the intention to delegate the power claimed must be clearly expressed.
"8d. That when there is such a delegation of powers, the ordinary, wellunderstood rules governing the relation of principal and agent apply with even
greater strictness to the political agents of the people. Such power as the people have conferred on their agents, they have, and all other power is withheld, or
reserved to the people themselves.
"4th. If the agents of the people thus authorized do those acts only to which
their delegated powers extend, what they do is the act of the people, and if hot
in contravention of ' the supreme law of the land,' is binding on all ditizens of the
state; but if the agents of the people transcend their power, and attempt to do
something which the people have not authorized them tb do, then they are, as to
such unauthorized act, entirely without warrant, and their action is mill -ahd
void.
-,5th. That the ousting ordinance was in no sense 'an amendmnt of the
constitution of the state' of Missouri; that it does not alter the organic law, but
it is a mere sentence against certain designated officials, iiiflicting upon them,
without charge or trial, a deprivation of office; and said ousting ordinance being
beyond the powers of the bonvention (as defined in the Act or Feb. 101h 1864,
and ratified by the vote of the people in Nov. 1864), is threfore a bufmratin.
I
I
of power, and void.
"6th. A political agent, or agent of the state, may. like an agent of an individual, transcend his powers by doing something not within the scope of his,
authority. In this case his act may be ratified and confirmed by his constituents
upon a direct reference of it to hem, and, in that case, ratification of the act
takes the place of an original authoriy to do it. But nothing of this nature
can be pretended in aid of the act of the late convention, called the *Ousting
Ordinance, for that ordinance never was submitted to the people for ratification,
and if it ever took effect at all, was effectual on the 1st of May 1865."
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removal of the judges, different opinions may be and are entertained. We -freely confess our dislike to the arbitrament of
judicial questions and controversies by the bayonet. The bayonet may cthink," but we like the thoughts of judges better.
Our history and jurisprudence alike show that our practice, our
ideas, even our instincts, are in favor of the peaceable solution
of all such questions.
As a consequence of this and of our system of government by
which its powers are distributed into departments, and each
department, instead of being supreme, is only an agent of the
-people, we have given a broader scope to the remedy by quo
warranto or to proceedings in that nature, than is to be found in
the jurisprudence of any other country.
in England quo warrantodoes not lie to test the right to offices
of a political nature derived from the crown, these being thereby
invested'with a sort of sovereignty. But in this country the title
to all public offices, from highest to lowest, may be tried in this
proceeding.
In Commonwealth vs. Fowler, 10 Mass. 290, 301, an early
case (A. D. 1813), it was claimed that an information in the
-nature of quo warranto did not lie against an officer appointed
and commissioned by the Executive; that as the Executive has
the exclusive right of appointing, so he has the exclusive right
-of determining when a vacancy in an office exists, the filling of
-which appertains to that branch of the government, the Executive being a branch of the government of the state, equally
independent with the judiciary. But the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, not assenting to this reasoning, held that the
validity of the appointment was judicially examinable. The
-same principle is very strongly asserted in The &ate vs.
Deliessline, I McCord (S. C.) 52 (1821), and in the cases there
cited; the Court (1 MeCord 59) observing: "cThe Constitution
is the supreme law of the land, equally obligatory upon representatives and individuals, and if a person is inducted into office
by an unconstitutional law, this court will declare it inoperative
and void." (Dorr's Case, 3 R. I. 299). In the celebrated case
of Bas8hford vs. Baratow (4 Wisconsin R. 567, 1856, approved in
Monthly Law Reporter, May 1856) the Supreme Court of that
state decided, and. we think properly, that where an incumbent
of the office of governor of the state held a certificate of re-elec-
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tion from the board of canvassers, that it had the jurisdiction and
power to inquire into the legal right of the person thus holding
the certificate, and to oust him if not legally entitled. Such a
power by the judiciary over the incumbent of the executive office
was stoutly denied by the respondent's counsel, but firmly asserted
by the court, by whose judgment the respondent was ousted, and
the relator established in the office to which the people had
elected him.
Ordinarily, quo warranto lies and is available to test the right
to a judicial office: State vs. McBride, 4 Mo. Rep. 303, 1836;
Clark vs. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. State Rep. 129, 1858; -x parte
Davis, 41 Me. 38; The People vs. Cowles, 13 N. Y. (3 Kern.)
350 (determining right to office of supreme judge); State vs.
Moffit, 5 Ohio Rep. 359, 1832 (contest for judgeship of the Common Pleas): and see generally The People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y.
532; approved The People vs. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86, 88; The
People vs. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45; Cook vs. Welch (contest as -to
state treasurer's office), 14 Barb. 259, s. 0. affirmed 4 Seld. 67;
The People vs. Van Slyck, 4 Cow. 297; The People vs. Vail,
20 Wend. 12; The People vs. Seaman, 5 Denio 409. But we
do not see how the validity of the vacating ordinance could be
judicially determined by quo warranto or other direct proceedings in the peculiar exigency of the present case. Every circuit
judge in the state was ousted, and therefore interested in the
question. The supreme judges were'directly interested. Neither
the old or new judges could sit in the proceeding& by quo warranto, if they bad been instituted. The question involved, viz.,
the validity of the vacating ordihance, was, as we think, though
there is ground for a conirary opinion, judicial in its nature;
but, unfortunately, there was, as far as we can see, no competent
judicial tribunal to try it.'
It is analogous to the illustration put by C. J.-TAxHLy, in
1 The Courts claim the right, in appropriate bases, to determine the validity
and existence of constitutional amendments. Thus it is held that a state constitution can only be changed by the people in general convention, or in the
mode prescribed in the instrument itself by submitting proposed amendments
to the people; and if, in the latter method, every requisition of the constitution
must be observed, and whether observed, will be judicially exatinei and decidd:
Collier vs. Ferguson, 24 Ala. 100, 1854; State vs. ArcZride, 4 Mo. 803, 1836;
Pratt vs. Allen, 13 Conn. 109, 1839; Opinion of Supreme Court, 6 Cush. 573;
People vs. Auditor, 3 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 332, 843, where the question how far
the action of the Executive is the subject of judicial cognizance is somewhat
discussed. And see also State vs. Noffit, 5 Ohio R. 362.
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Luther vs. Borden, before referred to, as to the validity of the rival
governments of Rhode Island. Without quoting, see 7 How. 89,40.
So here, if Judges BAY and DRYDEN should come to the conclusion upon the trial that the vacating ordinance was valid,
-they would cease to be judges, and be incapable of pronouncing
a judicial decision upon the question they undertook to try."
They cannot decide as a court at all unless they first affirm the
invalidity of the vacating ordinance. And so, the new judges
could not decide it without necessarily affirming its binding force.
What is the remedy? Where is the forum to decide? It
seems clear that impeachment would not be applicable to the old
judges if they held on, because if the vacating ordinance was
valid, they had the legal right to continue in office; if not valid,
they would not be judges at all, and hence impeachment or address would not lie. Again we inquire, Who is to decide ? The
matter is urgent. Infinite confusion and embarrassment if not
strife and judicial anarchy are the result of having two sets of
judges, only one of which, it is certain, has the legal right!
iHfdreti vs. lrIntire, 1 J. J. Marsh. 206.
In the course of the argument of the celebrated quo-warranto
case above referred to of Ba8hford vs. Barstow, to determine
*the right to the office of governor of Wisconsin, the chief justice
put to the counsel for the respondent the following question:"CHIEF JUSTICE WHiToN.-Suppose, Mr. Carpenter (Hon.
Mat. H. Carpenter, of Milwaukie), we should return from dinner
to-day and find three members of the bar in our seats, who.
threaten to remain by force, could not the governor displace them ?
1MR. CAIPENTER.-Certainly not. The court, I should suppose, would not concede such a power to the governor. If the
governor may come here and establish the right claimants, then
he must have the right to decide who the right claimants are. If
he can decide that you are entitled to the bench, and establish
you there, then he can also decide that the three usurpers are
the rightful judges, and put them there. You should assemble
elsewhere, punish by fine, send the sheriff to call the militia to
arrest your rivals. But if the sheriff and the governor adhered
to those and -not to you, then you would be powerless, except by
an appeal to the people :" 4 Wis. R. 567, 616; also, p. 65 of the
printed trial, published by order of the legislature.
If, in the present case, the appointees of the governor had
assembled elsewhere, and, following the advice of Mr. Carpenter,
had issued warrants for the arrest of their rivals, the latter would
.VoL. XHL-46
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or could pursue the same course. Each court would have its
adherents, and a civil conflict mould be a natural if not necessary
result.
Even if there should be no breach of the public peace, the
embarrassment and confusion arising from two courts, or from
the doubts which would exist respecting the title of the different
judges, would be almost intolerable.- It is perhaps true that the
course pursued by the governor conduced to the peace and quiet
of the state. Still, it is a dangerous power to allow the executive
of a state to exercise. It may be that, in this case, his decision
was legally right: but the next time it may be wrong. The only
circumstance which relieves the act, or which restrains us from
an unqualified condemnation of it, is its apparent, if not real,
necessity. It was an exigency without a precedent. It is not
within our province to pass a judgment upon its expediency or
necessity. We only observe that it must find its mitigation or
justification, in whichever light regarded, if it finds it at all, in
the extraordinary and special circumstances of a case without a
parallel.
We are concerned with the case in its juristical, not in its
political, or, if it has them, its partisan aspects. The court
struggle in Kentucky shows the necessity of such action on the
part of the executive as will prevent strife and a subversion of
J.F.D.
justice.'
I An outline of this famous controversy, which came near plunging the state
into 'civil war, may be thus given: In 1820 Kentucky was a state of debtors,
and passed a series of ,,relief laws;" chartering the "Bank of the Commonwealth" with a deficient capital, whose issues soon depreciated, and prolonging
from three months to two years the right of replevying judgments and decrees,
unless the creditor would agree to accept at par the paper of that bank. In
1823 the Court of Appeals (Judges BoYnZ, OwsLrE, and MiLLs) in Blair vs.
Williams, and LOP87eI vs. Braahjars, 4 Littell Rep., decided that this act was
unconstitutional as to past contracts, as "impairing the obligation of contracts."
meeting of the leglature after the
The decision was unpopular. At the first
decision (1828-4) a mcz& y condemned the decision, but the requisite two-third
vote could not be had to impeacl or remove the judges. At the next session, as
the legislature could not abolish the office (being a constitutional office) or
remove the judges, they bought by indirection to do the same thing by an Act
to ,reorsanize" the Court of Appeals. Under this Act the Governor, Desha,
appointed four judges--BARy, HA&Gan, TRMBrL, and DAVIDGE, who constituted the "New Court," so caled, with whom the Governor sympathized and
acted. .The new judges for a while did business and rendered decisions (2 T. B.
Monroe's Rep.), but after a while ceased to do so. F. P. Blair was their elerk,
and by their order forcibly removed the records fromthe office of A. Sneed, the'

